Decisions to withdraw clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH) from people in the minimally conscious state are predicated on the question as to whether it is in the individual's best interests to continue with CANH and determined traditionally using a 'balance sheet' approach. The emerging case law in this area suggests that decisions may appear inconsistent and lack sufficient certainty and clarity of process. Using an analysis of statute, common law and academic commentary we articulate a typology for the elements that tend to engage in these decisions. Next, we construct a taxonomy of overarching legal and ethical issues and then proceed to develop a novel framework for holistic decision-making. We validate this on the principle upon which it is grounded: coherent weighting of elements and theoretical proof of concept. The framework has potentially far-reaching benefits that include consistency and transparency of decisionmaking, thereby enabling a more uniform judicial approach. We suggest this as a foundational paradigm for decision-making in this context.
I. INTRODUCTION
The minimally conscious state (MCS) which was first recognised around the turn of the century, 1 presents as a spectrum of profound brain injury that is positioned between the vegetative state (VS) and full conscious awareness. Although patients in MCS and VS demonstrate signs of wakefulness those in MCS are (only just) consciously aware, whereas those in VS are (supposedly) not. To confound matters further, levels of conscious awareness in MCS may fluctuate. This can present challenges for diagnosticians, decision-makers and providers of care.
2 What is usually agreed is that people in this poignant state are among the most vulnerable members of society. They are alive, dangling by a filament of consciousness, and lack capacity to decide for themselves.
Minimally conscious people lack capacity to make medical treatment decisions within the framework of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). 3 They are unable to comprehend or retain relevant information about treatment proposed, nor weigh this in the balance as part of the decision-making process. By existing standards they cannot communicate their decision. 4 With care and support people in MCS may survive many years, or at least until a medical incident intervenes or a decision is taken to withhold or withdraw treatment. 5 Death is inevitable following withdrawal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (CANH). Decisions to withdraw CANH from people in MCS or permanent VS (PVS) are often difficult to make and potentially ethically and legally challenging. In PVS there is small consolation that within the construct as currently understood, the person is not consciously aware. By comparison the person in MCS retains some conscious awareness and withdrawal of CANH might have psychological implications for that individual.
There is considerable variation in judicial approaches towards determining best interests in the context of withdrawal of CANH in MCS on apparently similar facts. We do not propose to dwell in any detail upon the case law because Huxtable and Birchley have recently examined the emerging common law and have concluded that the consistency of the law is open to question. 6 In Re M, 7 for example, the first case to consider the issue, 8 the sanctity of life was considered the preponderant factor that outweighed all other considerations, including accepted third party evidence of the woman's previously held opposing views. 9 Later cases, arguably on similar facts, were decided differently. In United Lincolnshire Hospitals 10 the clinical team and the woman's daughter and former husband were all agreed that withholding CANH would be in the best interests of N when an urgent application was made after she had not received nutrition for 31 days. Her continued physical resistance to all attempts to reinsert the tube contributed to the finding that withholding CANH would be in her best interests. 11 In M v N 12 withdrawal of CANH was found to be in the best interests of a 68 year old woman. Evidence of best interests was surmised largely on the basis of third party evidence of her previously expressed values and beliefs and respect for her human dignity. More recently in Briggs, 13 Charles J decided that best interests would be served by withdrawing CANH in line with respect for human dignity and the man's previous values and beliefs as deduced from testimony of his wife, friends, and family. Empirical work reveals different approaches to the assessment of best interests in that 'some judges will draw up a balance sheet, while others will not -and even when that approach is taken, different decisions might result, despite the recurring presence of similar factors on the balance sheet'. 14 In this article we address the need for a uniform approach by providing an original and innovative framework for decision-making for minimally conscious persons. We construct: (i) a typology of key elements for holistic best interests decisions for withdrawal of (or withholding) CANH based on current law and academic commentary; (ii) a taxonomy of underlying ethical and legal considerations; and (iii) a holistic framework for structured decision-making to promote transparency and consistency of process in these circumstances. We conclude by considering possible implications of our proposed framework, 15 which is significant and original in an approach to bring greater constancy to this contentious area of law. 11 After recognising that transcripts provide a summary only of key issues, it is unclear why N was not provided with a PEG and then returned to the care home where, on the evidence, she had previously been stable. 
II. TYPOLOGY OF ELEMENTS IN THE CONSIDERATION OF WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING CANH
Based on analysis of statute, case law and academic commentary we have identified and categorised the typology of key elements in withdrawal decisions as follows: (i) individual centred; (ii) quality of life; (iii) family (and others) centred; (iv) clinician (and health professional) centred; and (v) environment centred.
A. Individual Centred
In the jurisdiction of England and Wales, decision-making for people who lack capacity is set out in the MCA. 16 Unless an advance decision to refuse treatment exists, decisions must be made by others based on common sense, charity, and humanity and underpinned by respect for their wellbeing. 1. Advance care planning Mechanisms for advance care planning include advance decisions, 18 welfare attorneys, 19 or statements of wishes. If an advance decision 20 is valid and applicable, its takes effect as a contemporaneous refusal. 21 Nevertheless, since it is almost impossible to envision all forms of treatment that might be offered or potential circumstances that might transpire, appointing a named person as a surrogate decision-maker under a health and welfare Lasting Power of Attorney has theoretical benefits in that the surrogate can interpret the nuances of the decision-making context and make a decision that aligns more closely to the circumstances. 22 Assuming that precedent autonomy has been expressed through these mechanisms, some commentators have questioned whether these have sufficient moral authority to bind the decision maker. Although recognised in law as an extension of a person's right to self-determined choice, moral objections have been made regarding their primacy of status. 23 In making an advance decision, individuals must have sufficient information. While general information might be known to a person about catastrophic head injuries, it seems unlikely that specifics about MCS will be known, unless the person has first-hand knowledge of this condition. A priori, an advance decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment in this context is unlikely to be based on sufficient information, thereby weakening its moral legitimacy.
Even if a welfare attorney has been appointed, the question to be asked is whether a surrogate ought to make a decision such as whether to withhold or withdraw 16 CANH. As a matter of law, attorneys must make decisions in the best interests of the patient. 24 However, is an attorney, who may be acting alone, really best placed to do so? The assumption underlying all forms of advance care planning is that the previously competent person and the one who now lacks capacity are still one and the same. The profound changes caused by catastrophic brain injury are perhaps such that the characterisation of the person is altered sufficiently to fracture the link between the former and contemporary self.
There remains a huge lack of understanding about what it is to be minimally conscious. However, from existing knowledge it is evident that MCS is totally different to the cognitive perceptual and behavioural capacities of conscious life. Although it has been suggested that in MCS a decision focused on the contemporaneous well-being of person should trump a previously made advance refusal of treatment, 25 this view is not widely accepted and others argue compellingly that it is these exact circumstances where the true value of precedent autonomy comes into its own. 26 2. Best interests ('the section 1(5) requirement') Decisions for people in MCS must be made in their 'best interests', 27 a principle predicated on determining the net benefit for the individual by taking into account, and balancing, several disparate factors contextualised against the urgency and gravity of the situation. 28 The traditional balance sheet approach relies upon the subjective assessments of a decision-maker, having considered relevant factors and their importance, and then subtracting the burdens, or disadvantages, from each. 29 There is no stipulated hierarchy of factors and the weighting applied will be fact and circumstance dependent. There might be several apparent risks or 'peripheral factors in the case' as well as a 'factor of magnetic importance' 30 that are sufficient to tip the balance in favour of treatment. Decision-makers must therefore decide upon which factors sway their evaluation and which issues are centrally important. But how can factors that differ as widely as 'physical and mental suffering, chances of recovery, indignity, personal interactions with their environment, and the potential for regaining functionality', 31 truly be reconciled and measured against one another? This task is inescapably perplexing, ambiguous, uncertain and conflict-ridden for decision-makers because factors and circumstances are so dissimilar to one another. 32 Further discombobulation can 24 s 9(4)(a be expected when attempting to accommodate influences such as religious and secular beliefs and cultural backgrounds into a decision-making 'balance sheet'. In fact, many of these factors are interdependent and cannot be viewed, or weighed, in isolation. Section 4 of the MCA provides a non-exhaustive statutory checklist of factors to be considered when determining a person's best interests. This includes current and future interests, previously held wishes, beliefs and values, and the views of significant others. As asserted in Aintree, 33 the best interests test considers matters from the person's perspective which leads to patient-centred decision-making. The decisionmaking construct is one in which all relevant factors (medical and non-medical) are considered. The provisions of the MCA must also be read in conjunction with human rights legislation. As Baker J observed in W v M: 'A best interests assessment, properly conducted under English law in accordance with established principles, is fully compliant with ECHR . . . .'
34 At a minimum the Articles of principle relevance would seem to be the right to life, 35 the right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 36 the right to respect for private and family life 37 and equality in the enjoyment of the other Articles of the Convention.
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Withdrawal of CANH inevitably leads to death. The ethical crux of this decision was summed up neatly by Hoffmann LJ: '[T]his is not an area in which any difference can be allowed to exist between what is legal and what is morally right. The decision of the court should be able to carry conviction with the ordinary person as being based not merely on legal precedent but also upon acceptable ethical values.' 39 The starting point is the strong, albeit rebuttable, presumption that it is in a person's best interests to stay alive. 40 Aligning with the sanctity of life is respect for human dignity, which together represent core values at the heart of human rights 41 and other international Conventions. 42 Nevertheless, dignity is a contested concept that morphs between respect for autonomy and normative notions of an objective good. 43 In the context of withdrawal of CANH the right to dignity could be used to defend withdrawal, as well justify its continuation. 44 If dignity circumscribes the essential worth of every person to be recognised and respected then a tension might arise in the context of these decisions. For family and friends, the individual's inherent worth may be perceived to be that which cannot be sacrificed. Equally, continuation of CANH (which might be seen as serving no benefit other than maintaining biological life) may be 33 seen as an affront to dignity on account of the impoverished quality of that very existence. 45 3. Wishes and feelings ('the section 4(6) requirement') Decision-makers must consider, as far as is 'reasonably ascertainable' 46 the 'past and present wishes and feelings' of the person in MCS. 47 The duty incorporates consideration of the person's beliefs and values (as well as any relevant written statements); putting themselves in the position of the person concerned; 48 taking into account what the person would have considered had they had capacity, and drawing up the balance sheet that the person themselves would have drawn. 49 The need to consider 'wishes and feelings' suggests a substituted judgement-type approach. Although this has not been accepted traditionally as a matter of law in English jurisdiction 50 there has been an apparent shift in some recent decisions. 51 For these purposes a distinction must be drawn between considering matters from the person's point of view and considering matters through the lens of the person's wishes and feelings. The former might be endorsed on the grounds of individual-centred decisionmaking that depends upon how that person is at that particular point in time. The latter can be problematic especially in the context of incapacity, and may best be understood as a latent or dormant form of self-determination. While wishes and feelings might be relevant as part of overall considerations of best interests, it cannot be assumed that wishes will hold imperium.
In the Shrieval Lecture Justice Baker outlined a number of reasons why unqualified pre-eminence cannot be given to an individual's wishes. 52 Decisions made by individuals about their lives might well impact upon the lives of others. In the jurisdiction of England and Wales, perceptions of autonomy tend to be derived principally through the lens of a 'Westernised' framework whereas cultural variations might affect personal wishes and feelings. For example, it may be inappropriate for an individual's wishes to override, or even be expressed, in preference to those of another in cultures that are based upon hierarchical structures and where internalisation of autonomy is influenced by cultural relativism. 53 Overreliance on previously held wishes may impact adversely on other relevant matters or values in decision-making, and close attention must be paid to the context against which assertions of wishes and feelings have been made. Therefore, arguments based on relational grounds might ultimately constrain the basis of precedent autonomy under the cloak of beneficent paternalism. However, it is noteworthy that the Law Commission has announced in its proposals for wider 45 Briggs (n 13). 46 s 4(6). 47 s 4(6)(a). reform of the MCA that the best interests checklist will be amended to give particular weight to the ascertainable wishes and feelings of the person who now lacks capacity.
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4. Consulting others ('the section 4(7) requirement') The views of others must be consulted when determining the best interests of a person who lacks capacity. 55 This broad requirement includes the views of anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare, anyone named by the person as someone to be consulted, any welfare attorney and any court appointed deputy. In the absence of written statements about the person's wishes and feelings (as is usually the case), the views expressed by others is hearsay evidence. 56 The potential problems are manifold.
Can what someone else says be truly reflective of another's wishes or are those views consciously, or subconsciously, always influenced by the other's own interests? Even if the purported views are truly reflective is there sufficient assurance that these were the considered views of the person who now lacks capacity? The 'others' to be consulted includes friends and family and carers who, as 'well-wishers', might expect to have locus in the decision-making process. Interpreting and weighting these views can be complex. The consistency of purported views, their provenance, and the trian- Given that the now incapacitated person has experienced a major life event it is questionable whether she should still be subjected to the values of her prior incarnation. People often change after significant life events and previously articulated wishes may not represent their preferences reliably in new and usually unanticipated circumstances. Studies that have explored the stability of patient' preferences following lifechanging events demonstrate preference alternation when they actually experience that envisioned reality. 57 In effect this means that previously expressed views have at least some potential for unintended bias. This was recognised in Aintree Therefore, consulting and taking into account the views of others needs to be given importance commensurate with the circumstances of each case.
Future capacity ('the section 4(3) requirement')
Decision-makers must consider whether the person is likely to regain capacity in relation to the decision to be taken at some future time. 59 Recovery from MCS (sufficient to achieve decision-making capacity) is likely to be a long and slow process, if it happens at all. Of key relevance will be whether there is evidence of some meaningful recovery or improvement, particularly when withdrawal of CANH is being considered. In order to assess incremental recovery adequately the following factors need to be considered: requirements for review; the value and limitations of currently used assessment tools; emerging sub-categories of MCS; and the concept of brain 'plasticity'.
Consideration for review is predicated generally upon clinical decisions, and ensconced within the overall package of what is accepted as good clinical care within this specialism. Evidence-based guidance indicates that if no significant recovery has been made by twelve months then it is statistically unlikely (though not impossible) that further recovery will occur. 60 Since efforts to rehabilitate are likely to be underpinned by results of ongoing assessment an ethical question that arises is whether there is a moral or even legal right to regular assessment, given that a proportion of those in MCS will show signs of higher conscious awareness over the longer term.
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Clinical assessment of conscious awareness (as opposed to levels of consciousness) is challenging enough. As Wade notes, as yet there are no definitive set of tests that can prove that the 'neurological foundations needed to create and sustain consciousness are intact or otherwise'.
62 Assessment of change in conscious awareness is currently inferred from results of standardised tools that might not always be sufficiently fine-tuned to detect subtle changes in MCS. 63 There is now clear emerging evidence that MCS is not a static condition and that perceptual and behavioural capacities can vary widely among patients. 64 People in MCS (-) show only minimal levels of response and non-reflex movements, such as orientation of noxious stimuli, pursuit eye movements, or affective behaviours in relation to external stimuli. MCS (þ) is defined by the presence of command following, intelligible verbalisation, or gestural or verbal responses of 'yes' or 'no'. In other words, MCS (þ) patients demonstrate considerably higher levels of awareness. This distinction is important for several reasons. Firstly, patients who are MCS (þ) have higher levels of awareness which raises the question as to whether they should be treated as a discrete class rather than amalgamated within the wider MCS group. Secondly, this sub-category suggests that MCS is a spectrum disorder with patients displaying subtly different levels of awareness. It seems likely that with time, and an increase in the knowledge base and more sophisticated technology, the understanding and categorisation of MCS will be refined even further. While a moral distinction has been drawn between MCS and VS, there is an argument that sub-categorisation of MCS may lead to similar contrasts. It is necessary therefore to consider the possibility of regaining capacity with accurate decisions that can forecast possible future prospects. The emerging view that consciousness is based upon a dynamic equilibrium between integrated and differentiated information processing in the brain is based on the concept of 'plasticity' (malleability) of the brain as an organ. 65 This view is supported by ground-breaking research into the study of brain connectivity in patients using technologies such as high density electroencephalographic (hdEEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
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Recent neuroscientific research has identified the presence of 'spectral signatures' of reorganised brain networks in MCS. Using data from people with prolonged disorders of consciousness, researchers have identified specific brain networks that correlate with levels of conscious awareness, showing evidence of network mechanisms that could support cognitive function and consciousness in a significant minority of patients. 67 The use of fMRI has indicated that some patients are able to volitionally modulate brain activity in ways that would normally require high levels of cognition.
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Clinical trials using stem cells injected into patients with brain disorders have also shown modest, but demonstrable, improvements in function using sophisticated neuro-investigative techniques. 69 These findings suggest possibilities of new modalities for demonstrating subtle changes in consciousness in MCS, and potential for improvement.
B. Quality of Life
The ethical construct of the quality of life (QoL) is a broad, multidimensional concept that includes subjective assessments of positive and negative aspects of life. Considerations typically include estimations of longevity, the individual's psychological wellbeing, their physical and cognitive characteristics, and the type of life that can be anticipated. For some people, future prospects of simple pleasures may suffice, whereas for others it may not. Buchanan and Brock usefully distinguish between two different QoL considerations. The first relates to 'the social worth or interpersonal sense' of QoL which involves assigning some comparative value to the life of a person, and classifying that relative to the worth of others (usually for reasons of calculating costs and benefits of resource expenditure). The second relates to the 'intrapersonal or non-comparative sense' where judgments are made about the value, or quality of the 'individual's life to that individual, regardless of how society or would-be calculators of social utility evaluate it'.
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The basis for deciding that the QoL of an individual is impoverished sufficient to justify withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is embodied in the USA case of Saikewicz, and depends upon QoL as being specific to that particular individual without the social worth element. 71 The emanating principle is that QoL for any individual may be considered as negative, positive, or neutral. Circumstances that lead to negative connotations will reduce the overall QoL whereas 'good' circumstances or indications point to a positive QoL.
If the calculus of QoL is ostensibly neutral then the touchstone is the extent to which the individual derives any benefit from life. 72 For someone in MCS, continuing with treatment merely because it does no harm, or continuing because the person displays mere sentience, is insufficient justification to continue life-sustaining interventions (such as CANH). The question whether any benefit derives from life needs to be answered positively in terms of their potential for caring, as well as in terms of their relationships with others. Hawkins considers that capacity to interact with the world as well as the ability to care is a prerequisite for life to represent a benefit since ' . . . it is only through sustained interaction with our world that we can find an outlet for our caring . . . in short, without the capacity to relate to the world, the capacity to care would, at best, offer us nothing, and might in the worst case be simply a deep source of frustration'. 73 If it is argued that the mental state of people in MCS is so fragmented that they are unable to focus or care about anything at all, then it follows that they either derive no benefit from their continued existence, or that their overall QoL is neutral. Yet consideration must be given to even minor fluctuations in conscious awareness that could result in an upward shift in the capacity for caring or interaction status. This potential has long been supported by clinical and lay observation. Even though the implications are still unclear it is possible that fMRI, as well as other imaging techniques, might detect awareness, even in the absence of clinical evidence. 74 people may underestimate the subjective quality of life of the severely disabled, some of whom may value their lives. 75 People in the locked-in syndrome, where communication is possible, may have the desire to live. 76 One should therefore not be too quick to impart negative value to the QoL of someone in MCS especially when this is considered through the lens of non-comparative QoL.
C. Family (and others) Centred
In the absence of an advance decision or welfare attorney the court has long recognised the role of the family in determining best interests. In some jurisdictions the court appoints a close family member as a 'guardian' specifically to make surrogate decisions, on the basis that family members are optimally placed (due to longstanding proximity) to make an overall best decision for the person with no previously expressed preferences. 77 The complexities and emotional fervour in these circumstances may lead to familial discord that can degenerate rapidly into legal battles. 78 Among other matters, disputes may centre on differing perceptions of levels of conscious awareness displayed by their relative, and conflicting views about withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions.
79 Families may over-represent patients' interests. Calls for aggressive and potentially futile life-sustaining care, engendered by love and respect for the person in MCS, may be viewed by clinicians and the court as inimical, or based on inaccuracies that can muddle healthcare decisions. Disputes are not always due to the family's wish to continue life-sustaining treatment. In W v M 80 the family applied to have treatment withdrawn from M on the grounds that in her previously competent state she did not want to be 'dependent on others' and that she would prefer to 'go quickly'. Baker J declined the application, emphasising M's enduring consciousness (albeit at a reduced level) concluding that it would not be in her best interests to have treatment withdrawn.
A survey of public attitudes to the decision in W v M indicated that a sizeable cohort saw withdrawal of CANH in MCS as being justified, particularly since this aligned with previous wishes. 81 To the question 'Should treatment be stopped [in W v M]?' 47% agreed, 30.3% were unsure and 22.7% disagreed. In an earlier study, 199 US residents were asked their views on withdrawal of treatment from patients in VS, MCS, and locked-in syndrome. 82 In respect of MCS, 20.6% of respondents Empirical research on withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in MCS is sparse. The data above suggests that only a minority of laypeople would disagree with stopping treatment from people in MCS, either for themselves or for others. The factors that influenced decisions about treatment withdrawal were ranked as: presence of consciousness; autonomy; ability to interact with others; suffering; dignity; best interests; best interests of the patient's family; distributive justice; religion; sanctity of life; and longevity. Although these findings do not necessarily dictate normative ethics, they perhaps offer a litmus test of public perceptions.
Recognition of interrelationships between people and their families, or other units within society, leads to consideration of the individual's interest within the good of the unit as a whole. In the research above, for example, some participants equated an individual's best interests with the best interests of the family. While this chimes, to some degree, with conceptions of relational autonomy it fails to align with current law. Decision-making for people who lack capacity focuses primarily on the individual's self-regarding interests, rather than the interests and good of others. Although evidence of altruism by a previously competent person has influenced a best interests decision that concerned property and affairs, 83 consideration of family, or other interests, could be open to abuse for decisions about treatment withdrawal.
D. Clinician (and Health Practitioner) Centred
For Pellegrino and Thomasma:
[t]he architectonic principle of medicine is the good of the patient as expressed in a particular right and good healing action. This is the immediate good end of the clinical encounter. Health, healing, caring and coping are all good ends dependent upon the more immediate end of a right and good decision.
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The concept of the 'virtuous clinician' is based upon deontological obligations and fulfilment of duty as an external expression of an inner disposition to do what is right, and what is good for the patient. The practice of medicine is ultimately the right way to act in difficult and uncertain circumstances to achieve a specific end: that which is good for the person who requires medical care. Thus, clinical skill, compassion, empathy, benevolence, beneficence, and non-maleficence must be exercised with a constant focus on patient-centeredness.
When translating this into decisions to withdraw CANH from people in MCS, the doctor must be clear about the medical circumstances that support withdrawal and 83 Although there is some evidence that the courts have considered the interests of others, see Re G(TJ)
[2010] EWHC 3005. In this case, which concerned property and affairs, it was held that substituted judgment can be subsumed into considerations of best interests. 84 ED Pellegrino and DC Thomasma, For the Patient's Good. The Restoration of Beneficence in Healthcare (OUP 1998) 116-24.
the moral validity of holding this opinion. In line with beneficence and trust in medical practice, treatment must be effective and beneficial for the patient. To some extent CANH is ineffective treatment for MCS as it does not correct, or directly improve, the disorder of consciousness. However, compelling arguments can be made for its continuance to prevent dehydration, muscle breakdown and other inevitable biological responses caused by starvation. From this perspective CANH can almost always be viewed as providing some benefit, at least in a physiological sense. Hence, withholding CANH may be seen by clinicians as abjuring the duty of beneficence in the absence of a person's advance decision.
Beneficence is predicated on the benefit or 'good' of treatment and therefore CANH might be seen as supporting the clinical interests of people in MCS. However, even within the sphere of interests that are purely medical, beneficence is not absolute. In clinical practice there are two ethical limitations to beneficence, namely non-maleficence and futility. The 'good' of a treatment will not invariably follow an ascending linear trajectory. In reality the 'good' effect is better conceptualised as a 'bell shaped' curve, meaning that at a certain point the 'good' effect will begin to decline, and there may come a point when the effects are such that continuation will violate the principle of non-maleficence. Consider an extreme, hypothetical, example. A person suffers from a fatal condition X that is now in its terminal stage. Fortuitously, treatment B is available and will definitely prolong life, but due to the very nature of the treatment and its effects, the person's life would be intolerable. In this situation beneficence would cede to non-maleficence. While this argument can be applied to some clinical circumstances, it would be difficult to attribute such a swingeing state of affairs to CANH which is considered to be relatively non-intrusive and safe.
The second limitation to beneficence within clinical settings is that of 'futility' which is used to justify selective non-treatment of those with a very poor clinical prognosis. 85 From a medical perspective, futility can be 'physiological' or 'qualitative'. Physiological futility is, in essence, a technical decision that the treatment will not achieve its physiological objective. Qualitative, or normative, futility is a more nebulous concept, which balances anticipated burdens and benefits of treatment, against its overall acceptability. The Appleton consensus provides international guidance for decisions to forgo medical treatment. 86 Jecker and Pearlman 87 identify four main themes for decisions regarding futility of treatment: it is either useless or ineffective; it fails to offer even a modicum of medical benefit; it cannot possibly achieve the patient's goals; and it does not offer a reasonable chance of survival.
Futility and QoL considerations are relevant to determining best interests, but are distinct from one another. Lord Goff in Bland recognised this in stating that a: distinction may be drawn between (1) cases in which, having regard to all the circumstances (including, for example, the intrusive nature of the treatment, the hazards involved in it, and the very poor quality of the life which may be prolonged for the patient if the treatment is successful), it may be judged not to be in the best interests of the patient to initiate or continue life-prolonging treatment, and (2) cases . . . in which, so far as the living patient is concerned, the treatment is of no benefit to him because he is totally unconscious and there is no prospect of any improvement in his condition.
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In Aintree, 89 conceptions of futility were re-examined. In the Court of Appeal futility was to be measured against the goal which was sought to be achieved, including whether the treatment had any real prospect of curing, or at least palliating, the person's condition. 90 In allowing the appeal the Supreme Court stated that this was to set the goal too high, 91 suggesting a notable shift from medical models of futility to wider and aggregate conceptions of benefit.
On this basis there would seem to be two broad categories within clinical contexts where treatment withdrawal may be justified on grounds of futility. In one, there is no benefit because the individual's quality of life is (and will remain) very poor; in the other the treatment would not provide even some benefit (rather than a real prospect) in respect of either curing or palliating the disease. In both groups, decisions will be taken on the basis of 'best interests' but in one futility of treatment in respect of ameliorating the disease will be the limiting factor, whereas the other will be premised on the balance between benefits and burdens of treatment in respect of the individual's current and future life. While these principles remain theoretically distinct, a strict demarcation between the types of cases seems artificial since in reality both QoL and futility are likely to factor into decisions to withdraw CANH decided on the overall best interests of the person.
In Aintree, the requirement for 'some benefit' flowed from the context of 'curing or at least palliating the life-threating disease or illness from which the patient is suffering', 92 which is more likely than not to be medically predicated. It is understandable that the 'real prospect' bar in these cases may be set too high, but where should the de minimus limit of 'some benefit' actually lie? What appears to be more troublesome is the statement that '[a] treatment may bring some benefit to the patient even though it has no effect upon the underlying disease or disability'.
93 This would seem to run counter to established principles of acceptable medical practice, especially as it seems to be that (as far as we can ascertain) even a psychological benefit cannot be brought in support of conditions such as MCS.
It is arguable that Lady Hale's requirement for 'some benefit to the patient', though undoubtedly well-meant, is just (another) legal term of art, and aimed at promoting patient-centeredness in decision-making. Greater subjectivity is now required in considerations of futility, which is just one aspect of an all-encompassing best interests 88 decision. Although likely to fall within the purview of the clinical team, the views of significant others will be instrumental in deciding on futility.
E. Environment-centred
One seldom expressed consideration in decisions to withdraw CANH is that of resources. Considerations of distributive justice may lend support for withdrawing treatment from people in MCS. For Shepard the reasoning is clear: 'Caring for an MCS patient is expensive. Funds are limited. If all illness is equal, we should distribute funds in a fair way: you must answer the 'relative' question of whether one life is more worth living or less expensive to support than another.' 94 Intersections between theories of distributive justice and patient-centred best interest decision-making have been articulated widely. 95 Essentially, arguments tend to rest on the experiential interests of the individual and the extent to which a person with no experiential interests whatsoever (for example in PVS) should have a legitimate claim on scarce resources. People in MCS, however, are minimally conscious and hence there is a moral basis for promoting the individual's wellbeing. Investigative technology suggests that experiential responses might be detectable in this cohort. 96 The speed and power with which technology is evolving cannot be underestimated in respect of its potential impact on the morality and ethics of withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Only a few years ago, it would have been almost inconceivable that the body of a brain dead deceased could be kept frozen in perpetuity in case of future revival and yet cryonic preservation, although not mainstream, is a privately funded choice that has been recognised by the court.
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There is a general reluctance to accept that the rights of others, based on arguments of distributive justice, may impose limits on the rights of people who lack decision-making capacity. This apparent unwillingness is reflective of the extreme vulnerability of these people, as well as the inevitable outcome of withdrawal of CANH. In the study on lay attitudes to treatment withdrawal from people in MCS, relatively low importance was given to distributive justice. 98 One reason could be the perception of hard heartedness in allowing financial calculations to dictate the outcome of life-and-death judgments. However, there is no gainsaying the fact that it is costly to keep people in MCS alive. They are not terminally ill and treatment usually brings relatively modest gains. Even if the person was to improve, it would be highly unlikely for them to resume a position of gainful employment in society that would substantially or wholly repay what they have received-at least in financial terms. These are hard thoughts but also part of reality, since estimated costs for caring for a person in VS amounts to nearly £100,000 per year.
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Resource allocation has not been addressed directly by the courts in this context. 101 In Re M, 102 the first case to consider whether withdrawal of CANH would be in the best interests of a woman in MCS, the issue of resources was raised in evidence as one of the factors that could engage in the decision-making process. The expert witness pointed out that while it should not weigh heavily in the determination, there were considerable costs to the State of maintaining her care. Given the prevailing resource constraints of healthcare services, this level of expenditure (which could amount to more than a million pounds over the remainder of M's life) 103 would inevitably deprive others of resources that could potentially make a real and substantial difference to their quality of life. As a matter of law, reluctance to consider broader impacts of decision-making, such as resources or perhaps the interests of carers or potential burdens to families and the state, aligns squarely with the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection, which is to consider whether the treatment proposed is in the best interests of the person concerned. Yet the clear interdependency of agents and interested parties may not, in practice, be separated quite so easily. In the clinical context resource considerations pervade clinical decision-making, whether consciously or not. 104 Treatment options are resource dependent, as are decisions about prioritisation of patients. Difficult decisions about who to treat and who not to treat must be, and are, made constantly by health professionals who have to grapple with these issues. Health authorities must make legitimate choices between competing claims on their resources since they will not usually have sufficient funds to meet all. In making these decisions, commissioners can legitimately take into account a range of considerations, including the proven success or otherwise of treatments. 105 The cost of court proceedings in relation to withholding or withdrawing CANH is not inconsiderable and as such represents a further factor that can influence whether applications are brought to court. 106 An uncontested application for declaratory relief in the Court of Protection costs around £122,000. 107 Since applications are usually brought under welfare and best interest provisions 108 this in effect, precludes the availability of non-means tested legal aid. This might potentially interfere with access to justice, as provider healthcare organisations will often be in a stronger position to bring an action compared with families who may have differing views.
Attempts have been made by families to access court representation funded by legal aid using the Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (DoLS). 109 Under DoLS the test to establish whether someone is deprived of their liberty is whether they are subject to continuous supervision and control, and thereby not free to leave of their own volition. This includes not just physical supervision or control, but also the reaction of the supervisor or controller should the individual try to leave. 110 In cases of MCS, a DoLS standard authorisation is required to protect the person's rights. One argument proposed in support of withdrawing CANH is that had the individual in MCS not been under DoLS provisions, they would have chosen to leave the facility and refuse life sustaining treatment. Recently, in Briggs, an application for non-means tested legal aid was successful using DoLS on the argument above, 111 although this was later reversed on appeal.
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III. TAXONOMY OF ETHICAL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The ethical and legal principles that shape decisions for withdrawal of CANH in MCS cannot be defined exhaustively due to the ever unfolding nature of law, neuroscience, medicine, and technology, all of which impact upon society and normative values. Complex decision-making for withdrawal of treatment involves compromises and leaves questions unanswered. Nevertheless a taxonomy that forms the basis for a working framework (as in the next section) is useful as it permits a mutuality for addressing multiple and interdependent factors at decision-making junctures. We hope that the taxonomy and subsequent framework proposed will provide a starting point for critical thought and application of principled decision-making for withdrawal of CANH that can develop positively and responsively to individual circumstances as well as advances in knowledge, to assist in resolving uncertainty, rather than offering a rigid formulaic solution.
In developing the taxonomy we consider the key issues from the typology of elements in decision-making (as in the previous section), academic commentary, and experiential evidence from clinical practice (AS), as well as insights from practising legal and clinical colleagues. A list of specific considerations likely to impact upon best interests decision was compiled. These considerations have been stripped to their core essentials for the purposes of their application to a 'best interests' determination, from an ethical and legal perspective. Using inductive reasoning we have allocated considerations which appear broadly similar in terms of content into subgroups linked by a common thread between the components, and which fall within one of the two parent groups of ethical considerations and legal considerations.
We aim to provide a pragmatic quality to the themes of the subgroups by viewing decision-making elements through a prism of factors that would be of major relevance to the individual, the immediate decision-making environment and the overarching structure within which these all operate. 113 The taxonomy therefore has practical relevance in accentuating drivers for determining best interests in decisions regarding withdrawal of CANH, as well as being of conceptual relevance for the framework proposed. The taxonomy of ethical considerations are shown in Table 1 , and that of legal considerations in Table 2 .
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR HOLISTIC DECISION-MAKING
A. 'Holistic' Best Interests In Aintree, Baroness Hale observed that:
' . . . in considering best interests . . . decision-makers must look at [the patient's] welfare in the widest sense, not just medical and social and psychological; they must consider the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual and ask what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare in particular for their view of what his attitude would be'. 114 She observed further that 'best interests' had to be considered 'in a holistic way' 115 and that the 'best interests' test should also contain 'a strong element of 'substituted judgement'. 116 Key elements that emerge from Aintree are that welfare must be considered in the widest sense and that decisions must be taken in a holistic way. Her reiteration that decision-makers should put themselves in the place of the individual and that interests should contain a strong element of substituted judgement suggests that every consideration for the welfare of individuals from their own perspectives should lie at the heart of decision-making. Holistic decision-making is therefore a decision that should be based upon a full and considered analysis of the widest welfare of the person. We propose a framework for underpinning holistic decision-making (for the 113 (dis)continuation of CANH in MCS), based upon the typology and taxonomy of pertinent contextual factors, as discussed previously. This is depicted in diagrammatic form in Fig. 1 . 117 Within the construct of this paradigm are two broad categories of 'constant' and 'variable' components. Constant components are those considerations of either general applicability or which are (relatively) settled in respect of the case in question. Variable components are those that are either time, or circumstance, dependent and are therefore changeable. individual's condition. The components that we propose are not exhaustive and other case-specific considerations can be accommodated flexibly.
At the heart of the framework is the person in MCS. Out of respect for prospective autonomy, valid advance decisions (as well as evidence of values and beliefs as ascertained from consultation with family, close friends, and carers) are positioned in close proximity, in alignment with Aintree 119 and the statutory framework. 120 The components must be considered within the context of other inter-dependencies of the MCA (discussed later) and the situational and professional contexts, bearing in mind the imperative that decision-making operates within the extant legal and ethical framework as depicted by the other circles of the diagram in Figure 1 . The outcome will necessarily be case-specific and dependent upon all the factors taken into account through this paradigm.
Most effective outcomes in decision-making have been identified through application of principles of contingency theory, and have been shown to result from optimal matching of key characteristics of decision-making within the structure of a valid framework. 121 At the centre of contingency theory 122 is the concept of hierarchy and interdependency of categories. In other words there are a number of inter-related connecting points between taxonomical categories and individual descriptors between the categories, some of which are of general applicability and others that are case-specific. These may act as powerful adopters and drivers that impact upon the final determination.
B. Validation of the Framework
The purpose of the proposed framework is to achieve a decision that is formed holistically and which represents the best interests of the person who lacks capacity. In this instance it pertains to the withdrawal (or otherwise) of CANH from people in MCS, but the general underlying tenets may have wider application. We argue that the proposed framework has validity based on the principle upon which it is founded, the weighting of relevant factors and theoretical proof of concept.
Principle
The principle upon which the framework is founded is that of reducing the effects of unconscious bias in order to minimise inconsistency in best interest decision-making. The pioneering work of the Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman 123 shows that when confronted with a choice, the judgment of the decision-maker is often based on cognitive bias (systematic errors) and over-reliance on heuristics, thus creating a supererogatory assurance that leads to a tendency to predict an intuitive outcome that the decision-maker may think best represents the data or circumstances. 124 As stated:
'The study of decisions addresses both normative and descriptive questions. The normative analysis is concerned with the nature of rationality and the logic of decision-making. The descriptive analysis, in contrast, is concerned with people's beliefs and preferences as they are, not as they should be.'
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Kahneman and Tversky show that the tension that exists between normative and descriptive considerations leads to an unconscious bias of psychophysics (the bias of awarding undue weight). This in turn may result in decisions being made that are based primarily upon the experiential values of the decision-maker, rather than the touchstone of the purist value mandating that decisions should be based upon the contribution of various factors that are relevant to each case in question. 126 Applying this general principle to withdrawal of CANH in MCS, one can appreciate very readily the immense challenges faced by decision-makers. While it may not be possible to eliminate all heuristic biases, there is nevertheless an urgency to articulate a valid framework by which such biases may be minimised in the overall best interests of the person in MCS.
Weighting
Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is a decision that is based upon multiple domains 127 rather than a single issue. On the basis of our typology and taxonomy, the key domains (in no order of preference and non-exhaustively) are: sanctity of life; advance care plans; purported wishes and feelings; quality of life; potential recoverability; the views of others; and futility of treatment.
Although the MCA identifies factors to be taken into account in decision-making, the Act is silent about the weighing of each factor within the best interest calculus. Decision-makers must decide ultimately on which factors will sway their discretion and which issues are centrally important. But how can a range of factors such as physical and mental suffering, loss of dignity, chances of recovery, and conscious awareness' 128 be compared and assessed against one another? The task is patently conflict-ridden since the facts and circumstances of each case are invariably unique. Since there is no guidance on the approach to be taken for weighting factors on the best interests balance sheet, the rationale for justifying why one factor is more important than another is wholly subjective to the decision-maker. Weighting is therefore a critical step in this process, and as far as can be ascertained, the rationality underlying weighting has not been defined overtly in those cases that have come to court.
We propose that assigning weight to factors should be considered as a two stage process: critical weighting and circumstantial weighting. The critical weight attached to theory on decision-making has long been accepted as a major theoretical construct in other areas of academia. each factor depends upon how fundamental that particular factor is. Take, for example, the sanctity of life. Lord Goff in Bland expressed this as a "fundamental principle."
129 On a scale of 0 -1, this principle would therefore be awarded a critical weight towards the upper end.
Consider now the principle of autonomy. Contemporaneous autonomy considered as a fundamental principle and balanced against sanctity of life may be awarded the same critical weight. 130 However, for a person in MCS who lacks capacity, the weight ascribed to a previously determined autonomous decision will depend upon the strength of evidence available. Autonomy expressed through a valid and applicable advance decision or a formally appointed welfare attorney would be expected to carry greater weight compared with hearsay wishes and feelings. The critical weight given to each factor (relevant to each case) will be allocated similarly on a scale of 0-1, with reference to its relativity to the concept of 'fundamental' as a principle.
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The second stage of weighting is circumstantial weighting. Circumstantial weight depends upon case-specificity as well as the type and quality of supportive evidence. Each of the factors above with an attached critical weight is weighted in respect of its operational relevance in that particular case, and graded on a scale between 0-100%. For a factor of high critical weight, for example, the overall weight might be reduced relatively if the circumstantial weight is low. Likewise, for a factor with a low critical weight, the overall relative weight might be heightened by an accompanying high circumstantial weight. Each factor, with its critical and circumstantial weight, now forms a criterion, and all factors thus weighted contribute to the criteria that form the matrix for multiple criteria decision-making in respect of best interests in withdrawal of CANH.
Theoretical proof of concept
We provide theoretical proof of concept using symbolic logic. Use of symbolic logic for the purpose of providing proof of an assertion is the accepted method in many disciplines. 132 Although less commonplace within legal academia, we have used this technique profitably in the past. 133 Our reasoning is presented below. The weighted factors (described above) form the multiple criteria for decisionmaking. This may be given as w developed by Brans and colleagues, 134 as we consider this approach to be optimal for qualitative data in situations of uncertainty. It is adaptable to problem-solving where a finite number of alternative actions may be ranked while considering several (and sometimes) conflicting criteria.
In the context of withdrawal of life-supporting treatment, the key question is whether it is in the best interests of the person to continue invasive medical treatment.
135 This is the prism through which claims for withdrawal of CANH must be viewed. Assume that a expresses the preference of the action of withdrawal over b, which expresses the preference of continuation. Thus, the generalised preference may be given as {w The weighted average of a (the preference of withdrawal) over b (the preference of continuation) formed through a computation incorporating each criterion, provides a preference index which may be given as P(a,b)[0,1]. The preference index expresses a preference of a over b (or vice versa). The relative importance of criteria in the decision-making process is expressed through weighting. As weighting is the choice of the decision-maker, this allows that essential element of subjectivism (wisdom, experience, humanity) to be incorporated into a structured decision-making framework. Thus, by applying the framework and using the method described, withdrawal will outrank continuation of treatment preferentially when the computed preferential index P(a)[0,1] > P(b)[0,1], on the basis of a structured decision-making process. This thereby answers the question whether (or not) it is in the best interests of the person to continue with treatment.
In further support of theoretical proof of concept, we submit that the basic functionality described above may be developed further as exercised in a number of operational projects in other disciplines. 136 For example, the beneficial effect or 'goodness' of an action (in this case withdrawal of CANH is, say a, with b being continuation) can be taken as the sum of the indices P(a, i), indicating a preference of a over all other actions. Similarly, the 'not good' effect or 'inferiority' of a can be taken as the sum of the indices P(i, a) indicating a preference of all other actions compared to a. The 'flow' of these actions may be compared to assess whether a outranks b (in addition to the weighted preference index as above). 137 The challenge that input data may not be defined with a reasonable degree of numeric accuracy may be accommodated successfully within the proposed model by the use of fuzzy set theory. The numeric for weighting a 'grey' factor may be expressed in fuzzy form, rather than as a definite number, thereby giving it a 'grade of membership' within pre-set limits allowing flexibility for circumstantial specifics. 138 The purpose of using the framework for decision-making in the context of MCS is to reduce variance in outcome that may stem from heuristic bias in decision-making. What then would be the probability that assuming a defined set of similar criteria in two different cases that are judged by two different decision-makers, the outcomes would be the same? As the nature of making decisions is inherently subjective (at least to some degree) we propose that potential variance in outcomes may be addressed by using the framework to assure internal consistency in the operational process of making decisions for withdrawal of CANH, the outcomes of which then may be compared for concordance. It would be possible to test this by collecting the (distributions of) weighted preference indices P(a,b). A proper calibration for consistency may be set within parameters of acceptable limits. Thus, for example, for withdrawal decisions the parameter limits of testing a dominant preference for withdrawal may be given as X Pa > Pb [X 05 , X 95 ]. There would therefore be an expectation that for withdrawal decisions in cases with similar circumstances, the subsequent testing of outcomes, if consistent, should show that Pa lies within a 90% confidence interval estimate (of the distribution), with the probability of a 'false' or chance outcome of 10% or less, thereby testing objectively for assurance of consistency in framework-based decisionmaking.
C. Benefits of the Framework
Withdrawal decisions for CANH in MCS are predicated on the person's best interests. This assessment requires a balancing exercise to be performed between those factors that are for and against the individual's best interests. The general rule for ascertaining best interests is 'in each case . . . to balance all relevant factors', in deciding best interests of the person who lacks capacity. 139 It is noteworthy that Thorpe LJ referred to 'each case', thereby implying that this balancing process should occur in each and every case, whereas the reality is that 'the court will often [but not always] adopt a balance sheet approach. 140 As noted above, cognitive bias 141 and overreliance on heuristicbased decisions 142 may lead to inconsistent decisions. Huxtable and Birchley 143 provide empirical evidence that in eleven out of seventeen cases (of CANH withdrawal in MCS within their search period), no balance sheet was provided. In eight of these the absence was explicable, and in three a balancing exercise was not undertaken. Some of the reasons given included the inability to balance the intrinsic value of life against pain and indignity, not being able to compare like for like, 144 the 'artificiality' of a balance sheet for a particular person, and the difficulty of balancing opposites (such as the philosophical against the personal).
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It is to address these gaps in consistency that we propose a framework as a potential solution. There is a need for uniformity of decision-making approach, albeit that outcomes will be different and dependent upon the nuanced characterisations of each case. We suggest that inconsistency of approach can be limited by the framework, which is constructed on relevant principles and which provides validated structure, internal consistency and assurance that serves to limit inadvertent heuristic bias in decision-making by using a rationally articulated process in each case.
Each factor in each case needs to be considered systematically and then weighted. The two-stage weighting process is important. Critical weighting reflects the 'absolute' importance of that factor and may depend upon the intrinsic relevance of that criterion from a moral or philosophical perspective. As stated already (in the section on Weighting) human life will carry a high critical score because of the moral sanctity and value of life. Circumstantial weight will depend upon individual specific factors and the evidence supporting the state of the individual in respect of these. Hence, circumstantial weight accorded to human life may be lessened by the overall level of impoverishment of the quality of life. Likewise, pain and indignity (for example) may carry a lower critical weight but a higher circumstantial weight, depending upon the strength of the (medical and other) evidence that is offered. It is the combination of critical and circumstantial weighting of each individual criterion viewed against the preference of withdrawal or continuation of CANH, that goes to form a preference index and the weighted averages of all the factors (in sum) within each of those preference streams are balanced in order to make the final decision of whether it is in the person's best interests to continue with CANH. Framework based structured decisionmaking therefore allows for comparison of issues that are not 'like for like', as well as a 'balance of opposites', as the rigour of process within the structure serves to 'smooth' the balancing of what might be seemingly incomparable when viewed in isolation through a qualitative lens.
We argue that a structured decision-making process founded upon a framework based upon a taxonomy and typology of relevant and germane considerations, carries advantages of clarity and systematic process whereby each relevant criterion is included, weighted, and assessed in respect of a preference choice and then incorporated into the final decision-making calculus. Structured decision-making is a concept which in principle should be familiar to the judiciary. decision-making will add transparency and consistency to this area of law where there appears to be a level of unexplained variability. The framework is not intended to compel complex mathematical computations, nor to act as a rigid 'cage' of cold detached formulism for algorithmic 'robotic' decisions. We are acutely aware that end-of-life decisions are poignant and nuanced and that 'life and death' decisions are likely to attract the gaze and inflame the imagination of the media but possibly also international dignitaries, as a recent case has demonstrated. 147 The public must be assured that these decisions are based on wisdom, experience, and humanitarianism. Judicial discretion can be applied within our framework in the weighting of the criteria, particularly in the circumstantial stage, which will depend upon accepted evidence that is tested by the court, or other decision-making body.
We accept that the conceptual basis of the framework will need to be fleshed out in terms of practical operating procedures. However, we believe that framework-based decision-making will reduce arbitrariness and serve to apply the 'best interests' principle in a more transparent and comprehensible way which might be a comfort to family and carers, as well as being verifiable, and ultimately beneficial to the person in MCS.
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT
A. Decisions in Court: by Default or Need? Despite the relative rarity of MCS 148 the common law in this area is proliferating. This is, in part, because decisions to withdraw CANH from people in MCS 'should' be referred to the Court of Protection for a declaration of lawfulness. 149 When making decisions about life-sustaining treatment the MCA Code of Practice also requires that where there is any doubt about a person's best interests an application should be made to the Court, 150 and that the court 'must' make this decision for people in PVS. 151 To some extent this is an anomaly. Although rightly considered to be tragic, decisions to withdraw and withhold life-sustaining treatments, including CANH, are not unusual in other, arguably equally tragic circumstances such as end stage terminal illness when therapeutic efforts achieve little else than extension of the dying process. For many commentators singling out people in PVS and MCS is unjustified, 152 although principled arguments have been made for judicial involvement. 153 Apart from philosophical considerations, reservations against routine court involvement can be made on pragmatic grounds. Accessing the declaratory process is expensive in terms of time and significant financial and emotional costs can be incurred by the family and healthcare providers. 154 A recent study shows that the average time taken for a relatively straightforward best interest declaration, where all parties agree, can last for around 9 months with significant costs to the National Health Service. 155 Even with uncontested applications independent opinions regarding best interests are usually commissioned, witness statements prepared, and the results of diagnostic and clinical assessment tools must be available. The Official Solicitor usually commissions an expert report as well. 156 Whether, as a matter of law, referral to court is mandatory prior to withdrawing CANH from people in MCS, is a moot point. Ruck-Keene, for example, considers that since Practice Direction 9E (PD9E) requires that these decisions 'should' be bought to court, it is open as to whether this is a legal requirement, or rather one of best practice. Since the requirement is not found in statute he suggests that this cannot, as a matter of legal principle, be a requirement at law. 157 Nevertheless, although not written in statute, perhaps the requirement is found in common law. The House of Lords in Bland, for example, envisaged that decisions to withdraw CANH from people in PVS would need to be taken by the court at least until sufficient experience had been acquired, which would then obviate the need for applications in every case. But this decision was taken almost a quarter of a century ago, 158 and multiple cases of MCS (as well as PVS) have been scrutinised by the courts.
In the context of bringing these cases to court in Briggs, 159 King LJ stated that where the MCA Code and Practice Direction appear inconsistent it is the Code that takes precedence although in reality most decisions are reached by agreement between the parties. 160 According to King LJ, to suggest that every case should be decided by the court would impose unnecessary pressures on families as well as NHS resources. Although these were arguably obiter considerations, King LJ's comments have been reiterated in recent decisions. 161 More fundamentally, Sachdeva suggests that decision-makers might yet avoid the need for a declaration on basic legal principle: namely that there is no best interest decision to be taken. 162 For instance in Aintree, 163 it was stated that the MCA 2005 'has no greater powers than the patient would have if he were of full capacity'. 164 The Court, therefore, cannot compel a doctor to provide treatment which is not clinically indicated. If doctors have concluded that there is no treatment, including CANH, which is clinically indicated then arguably there is no best interest decision to be made. In this event instead of an application to the Court of Protection 165 an application under Part 8 of the Civil Procedure Rules for a declaration that their proposed actions would be lawful might be more appropriate. 166 On balance, it seems unlikely that hospital legal teams will decide against applying for a best interests declaration unless the Court of Protection Practice Directions are amended. For example, in M v A Hospital [2017] 167 the parties asked specifically whether legal proceedings were necessary in the event of unanimous agreement that CANH was no longer in the patient's best interests. Jackson J, citing Briggs, 168 held that notwithstanding PD9E, the decision about what was in the person's best interests could lawfully have been taken by the clinical team, having consulted the family fully and acting in accordance with the MCA. 169 The question as to whether reference to the court is, or should remain, a legal requirement has been considered recently by the ad hoc Court of Protection Rules Committee with a view to introducing change to PD9E at the end of 2017.
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B. Alternatives to Court Adjudication
In healthcare environments, where patients lack capacity, treatment and other care decisions predicated on best interests are typically made by 'multidisciplinary teams'. These are relatively informal groups of interested parties, both clinical and nonclinical, who collaborate with family and significant others. 171 Several commentators have suggested already that uncontested decisions to withdraw CANH from patients in PVS ought to be decided in the same way. 172 which are independent decision-making bodies created by statute.
judicial or not, the use of a clearly articulated framework could facilitate consistency of approach, assuring accountability and transparency of the decision-making process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Thirty years ago when speaking of the welfare principle as applied to children, Bainham stated that the decision-making process failed to establish coherent and consistent principles that governed relevant law. 181 In 2017, Huxtable and Birchley continue to bemoan the same: 'Despite three decades of judicial and legislative developments, his [Bainham's] comment appears no less pertinent today, and not only to judges' decisions about minors'. 182 Decisions to withdraw CANH from people in MCS remain riddled by lack of certainty and predictability. There is still a sense of judicial deference to medical expert opinion, 183 even when (some) weight is given to relevant and articulate views of well-informed family members and friends who express the pre-injury values and beliefs of the person in MCS. 184 Judges approach the best interests decision in different ways, they do not always use a 'balancing' exercise, and they tend to be unclear as to how much weight should be accorded to different elements that are relevant to the decision-making process.
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In this article we offer a holistic framework for decision-making that is innovative. Firstly, it is patient centred. The person in MCS lies at the very heart of the decisionmaking process. Secondly, it is based upon the typology and taxonomy of factors that are relevant and which are encapsulated within the overarching canvas of law and ethics. Thirdly, we validate the framework upon the grounding principle, coherent process of weighting and proof of concept. Framework based decision-making compels decision-makers to consider systematically the wide-ranging factors, both general and specific, in each case, and to weight these explicitly in order to arrive at an integrated best interests determination. It allows for reciprocal interaction between interconnected elements and promotes consistency and clarity of process and is therefore valuable to the judiciary who are experienced in this area. The general principles of the framework, while constructed through a lens of withdrawal of CANH in MCS, may also be applied in other best interests situations.
We suggest that the desirability of this decision-making process can be summarised in the words of an ascending contemporary writer:
It might at first have only a moral authority, but that authority could be substantial, for unlike those entities for which some humans were not human enough to exercise suffrage, this new assembly would speak from the will of all the people, and in the face of that will, it was hoped, greater justice might be less easily denied. 186 
